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This  paper investigates the matching of job searchers with vacant jobs: a key component of the
dynamics of worker reallocation in the labour market. The job searchers may be unemployed,
employed  or not in the labour force and we estimate matching or hiring functions including all
three  groups. We show that previous studies, which ignore both employed job seekers and
unemployed  job seekers who are considered to be out of the labour force, produce biassed
estimates  of the coefficients of interest. By considering only unemployment outflows into jobs and
ignoring  interdependencies with other flows, these studies overlook an important aspect of job
matching.  Our estimates on Australian data support a more general approach and produce models
that  dominate those proposed previously. We find that concentrating on the aggregate matching
function alone does not reveal the  full extent of the interaction across job searchers. Indeed, we
find  that job searchers from the three groups do not receive a fair share of hires: there appears to
be  segmentation of hiring opportunities which may be explained by a form of ranking of
applicants.  Together these results demonstrate that  the disaggregate worker flows and their
interdependence  are key features of the labour market and should be included in studies of the
hiring process.
* We are grateful for helpful comments and advice from the anonymous referee, Derek Leslie,
Alan  Manning, participants in the seminar series at Warwick and York Universities, from
conference  participants at the Australian Economic Society Meetings and EEEG ‘97, and for data
assistance  from Robert Wright. Responsibility for any mistakes or omissions is entirely our own.2
1These  figures are averages for the period 1980 to 1991. The correlation coefficients are for logarithms of outflow
rates  into jobs from each state with the log detrended  GDP on quarterly data. A Hodrick Prescott filter ( ë =1200)
was used to estimate the trend in GDP. 
I.  Introduction
There  are three possible sources of gross worker flows into employment in the labour market:
from  unemployment to employment; from not in the labour force into employment; and from job
to  job. In this paper, we consider the hiring process through all three of these flows using data
from  the Australian labour market. The flow to employment from unemployment is the smallest
of the three  flows constituting, on average, 20%  of the total flows. The corresponding outflow
rate  from unemployment into jobs is pro-cyclical (having a correlation coefficient of 0.76 with a
measure of the business cycle).
1 Flows into jobs from outside of the labour force make up 37%
of  the total flows and the outflow rate is also procyclical (the correlation coefficient with the cycle
is   0.44). Finally, the flow between jobs is the largest of the three flows (43% of the total) and the
flow  rate between jobs is similarly procyclical (with a correlation coefficient with the cycle of
0.50).  
Much  analysis of the flows from unemployment into employment has been carried out
(eg.,  Blanchard and Diamond, 1989, Layard  et al, 1991 and Burda  and Wyplosz, 1994). There
has  been some work on the flow of those in jobs into new jobs and the possibility of the
unemployed  facing competition for this group (Burgess, 1993, and Van Ours, 1995). There has,
however,  been very little analysis of  the flow of those people not in the labour force into
employment.  Indeed, a major simplifying assumption made in the literature is to concentrate
exclusively  on the flows of unemployed males. The justification usually offered for this assumption
is  insufficiency of data on those not in the labour force and the belief that this latter group is
dominated  by the behaviour of females who may face different constraints (eg., Pissarides, 1986,
Layard  et al, 1991, Burda and Wyplosz, 1994). By incorporating a range of complementary data
sources  we provide measures of all three of these stocks and flows. We address the possibility of
interactions  across the flows into employment  and examine the idea of ranking of groups in terms
of  new employment. We believe that this is the first  study which attempts a consistent, holistic,
approach to investigating these three major gross worker flows and their interaction. 
The commonly used mechanism  to model the process by which the stock of vacant jobs3
2Whilst  there is some evidence indicating mildly increasing returns to scale (Blanchard and Diamond, 1990), when
incorporated into a general  equilibrium model, the matching function is required to exhibit constant returns-to-
scale for there to be a balanced growth path for the economy (Pissarides, (1990).
and  the stock of available job seekers are brought together to produce job offers and then job
hires  is the matching function. We can quickly see why it is important to include all the possible
flows  of job seekers by considering the complex nature of this function. Without describing in
detail  the strategies followed by firms and job seekers, we can assume that the individual job
seekers  and firms on either side of this market are behaving optimally to provide the combination
of  available jobs and job seekers to create matches. The matching function can then be written as:
Mt = f (St , Vt ) (1)
where  the flow of new job matches or hires ( Mt)  over period  t is produced from a function of the
number  of available job seekers ( St) and number of  vacancies ( Vt)  at the start of the period. This
general relationship has been likened to  a production function (Blanchard and Diamond, 1989)
and  in that spirit the notion of returns to scale introduced. Extensive empirical work in the United
States  (Blanchard and Diamond, 1990) and the UK and other European countries (Burda and
Wyplosz,  1994, and Burgess, 1993, amongst others) has provided support for a constant returns-







where   ã  is a scale parameter capturing changes in the efficiency of the matching process (that
would impact on all searchers equally). 
We can address the general matching function (1) more fully by considering how each of
its  terms is constructed in more detail. The total number of matches  Mt  is the sum of hires  from
unemployment   Xt ; from outside of the labour force  Lt ; and from employment (job to job flows)
Jt  So:
Mt = Xt + Lt +   Jt  (3)
The  sum of the stocks that produce these new job matches is the total number of job searchers  St
which  is the sum of unemployed job searchers  Ut ; not-in-the labour force (NLF) job searchers
Nt ; and employed job searchers. There is no direct measure of the number of on-the-job searchers
(the  OJS), we therefore approximate this stock with a function  ö of  the current stock of employed
persons  Et;   ö(Et). So:4
St = Ut + Nt +   ö(Et)  (4)
This  implies that all searchers are perfect substitutes for each other in the hiring process regardless
of their labour market status. This may not be true. It may be that the component groups of the
total  number of job searchers actually have differing search effectiveness for a given set of job
vacancies.  For example, the search effectiveness of each group may be a function of its reservation
wage  which  may differ across labour market states  (Mortensen, 1986,  Layard  et al, 1991;234).
Also,  we would expect that search effectiveness may be influenced by a range of personal
characteristics  such as the duration of unemployment for the unemployed job seeker (Budd  et al.,
1988,  and Blanchard and Diamond, 1994). Thus, the true measure of effective job searchers may
be:
(4a) ˜ St’suU%snN%ö ( Et)
where  s  u  and s  n  measure the search effectiveness of the unemployed and NLF job searchers
relative to the on-the-job-searchers (the OJS), and the search effectiveness of the latter group is
normalised to unity.
The  complete disaggregation laid out in equation (4a) above has, however, typically been
ignored  in the literature on matching functions in general and in the empirical literature, in
particular.  Traditionally  (Pissarides, 1986, and Layard  et al,  1991), it has been assumed that the
constituent  parts of total hires ( Mt)  are  independent of each other thereby enabling the analyst to
concentrate  on the outflow from unemployment ( Xt)  determined by  the unemployment stock ( Ut)
and  vacancies ( ).  Adopting the constant returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas functional form, the Vt
model is then:
(5)   Xt’ã U
á
t V
( 1 &á )
t
This  reduced model is unlikely to capture more than a part of the complete pattern of flows into
jobs  and its popularity would appear to be predominantly due to data limitations. In addition,
Layard   et al (1991) argue for independent treatment of these flows without acknowledging that
the  stocks  and flows from initial states must be independent of one another. In a stochastic model
this  implies that they should be uncorrelated, an unlikely possibility given the cyclicality of all of
the flows noted above. In some cases (Blanchard  and Diamond, 1990),  the number of matches
has  been more broadly measured whilst the stock of available job seekers is modelled by
unemployment, resulting in potentially inconsistent flow and stock measures.5
The  coefficients estimated from such reduced models also may not necessarily measure
what  they purport to. The argument in Layard  et al (1991) would suggest that the partial
derivative   äXt /äMt will be equal to one. However, recent findings suggest  two major implications
for  previous empirical work. A matching function relating  Mt to  Ut and  Vt alone will be
misspecified and give  a downward biassed estimate of the unemployment elasticity of matching
(Broersma,  1996). Second, in the absence of a direct measure for the pool of searchers other than
the  unemployed, the resulting estimated equation will fail to reveal the complexity of the
relationships  between the various stocks and flows (Burgess, 1993). These two points will be
considered  in the estimation below. In this paper we use measures of all  the flows underlying the
matching  function and address the possibility, and implications, of their interdependence. In
particular,  we assess the extent to which there is evidence of job competition between groups of
job searchers and the implications of such competition for the aggregate matching function. 
We present our estimating equation in  Section 2, describe our data and the construction
of  the gross flows in Section 3, discuss our results in Section 4, and present conclusions and
suggestions for future work in Section 5 of the paper.
II.  Matching functions and flows into employment
If  all job vacancies are equally available to all seekers, we would expect that job seekers from any
given group would receive a share of  offers proportional to their share among the total number











where   i represents the given group.  Consider, for example, the determination of the hiring of  the





(7) Xt/ Ut’Mt/ St
As  discussed previously, it is important to use the right measures of job searchers in order to
address the consistency problems  raised by Broersma (1996) and the possibility of endogenous
competition  discussed in Burgess (1993). We therefore define the fair shares rule in terms of6
3Whilst  equation (7) is also at the heart of Burgess’ (1993) model of job competition between unemployed and
employed  job seekers, he ignores those outside of the labour force. Van Ours (1995) also employs this apportioning
of  job offers but only between those in the labour force. Van Ours conditions this on the aggregate matching
function (1) rather than on the total number of matches,  Mt.
4Our  premise here is that there is a general pool of vacancies, that there is a predetermined total number of matches
whose determination (for the  moment)  we do not analyze, and that the matching process operates in such a way
that  the outcome may result in potentially unequal hiring rates across searchers from different labour market
groups. Thus, we are conditioning on the total number  of matches but allowing the data to identify the share of
each group of job seekers in the total. 
effective job searchers by substituting   for   and    for   in equation (7)
3 to get: suUt Ut ˜ St St
(7a) Xt/ ( suUt) ’Mt/ ˜ St
Fair  shares in hiring can be considered as  random hiring or  no ranking.  In other words, when
employers are  faced with multiple applications for a vacancy, they do not exhibit any consistent
preference  for a candidate from one pool of job searchers than another (Blanchard and Diamond,
1995).   At the other end of the spectrum, employers may exhibit full ranking whereby job seekers
from  one group will only have their application considered if no-one from the preferred group has
applied  for the vacancy. In between these two extremes lays a range of hiring outcomes that
reflect  the preferences of employers who are combining ranking and no-ranking elements when
considering  heterogenous applicants from recognisable groups (Blanchard and Diamond,
1994;433). 
We are interested  in testing the fair shares hypothesis. If there is no ranking in the hiring
process,  estimates of the shares of the component stocks of total searchers across the three share
equ ations and the aggregate matching function will be the same (Blanchard and Diamond,
1989;34).  We consider this possibility below
4.   To test equation (7a) in log-linear form we employ
a Taylor series approximation for  : ˜ St













where,  for example,   is the steady-state value of  .  Consequently, we obtain an expression suU suUt
for the outflow rate from unemployment:7
5In  Burgess (1993) the number of employed job searchers is assumed to be an implicit function of the stock of those
unemployed.
ln ( Xt/ Ut) ’á 0%á 1lnMt%á 2lnUt%á 3ln( Nt/ Ut)
%á 4ln( ö ( Et) / Ut) %( 1 %á 2&á 3&á 4) lnsu%á 3lnsn
(8)
where  . ( 1 %á 2&á 3&á 4) >0
There are some additional measurement issues to solve before equation (8) can be
estimated.  For the number of job seekers outside of the labour force ( Nt)  we use a measure of
those  marginally attached to the labour force but not considered unemployed. We also need to
model  the stock of employed job searchers,  ö(Et).  We assume the number of employed job
searchers,   ö(Et), in period  t is equal to   Jt-1 /ãt-1  where  ãt-1 is the proportion of total employed job
seekers  who were successful in period  t-1.
5  This proportion is unlikely to be  constant, indeed it
may  be highly cyclical.  We therefore model  ãt-1 as a function of the state of the business cycle
directly, ie.,  ãt-1 =  , where   is the detrended level of GDP. The empirical success of this ˜ Y
â 1
t&1 ˜ Yt&1
particular  choice of function will be our evidence for its suitability given the absence of any direct
measure  of the number of employed job seekers. We will also compare our formulation with that
used  by  Burgess (1993). The  relative search  effectiveness of those not in the labour force (s n)  is
assumed  constant and that of the unemployed (s u)  is assumed to be a decreasing function
( ) where  is the proportion of long-term unemployed in the total. We su’( U
LT
t / Ut)
&â 2 ( U
LT
t / Ut)
therefore estimate  the determination of  unemployment outflows into jobs as:
ln( Xt/ Ut) ’á 0%á 1lnMt%á 2lnUt%á 3ln( Nt/ Ut)
(9) %á 4ln( Jt&1/ Ut) %á 5ln(˜ Yt&1) %á 6ln( U
LT
t / Ut)
Analogous expressions can be derived for hires from outside the labour force:8
6This  is not to say that any one equation will capture the true relative differences in search effectiveness. It is not
possibl e in practice to separate the demand and supply effects sufficiently to be able to distinguish between the
impacts  of search effort and the aggregate offer arrival rate for each group. However, differences across equations
are indicative of hiring probabilities varying by job type and we interpret this as ranking in outcomes.
ln( Lt/ Nt) ’ä 0%ä 1lnMt%ä 2lnNt%ä 3ln( Ut/ Nt)
(10) %ä 4ln( Jt&1/ Nt) %ä 5ln(˜ Yt&1) %ä 6ln( U
LT
t / Ut)
 and from employment: 
ln( Jt/ Jt&1) ’ç 0%ç 1lnMt%ç 2lnJt&1%ç 3ln( Ut/ Jt&1)
(11) %ç 4ln( Nt/ Jt&1) %ç 5ln(˜ Yt&1) %ç 6ln( U
LT
t / Ut)
We would expect, given the discussion above, that   implying all  equations á 1’ä 1’ç 1’1
are  for a share of  total matches. The adding up restriction this implies dictates that we consider
results  from two out of the three flow-share equations at a time. We would also expect the shares
of  the total stock of job searchers to add up to one, this implies  .  Of the remaining á 2’ä 2’ç 2’&1
coefficients, some will  reflect the importance of each of the relevant groups of searchers among
the total pool of searchers. They will be the steady-state shares given the log-linearisation. In
addition, the share of total effective searchers (implied by our estimates) of each group of  job
seeke rs should be identical across outflow rate equations. Evidence to the contrary would be
indicative  of unfair shares or ranking in the hiring process
6.  Other coefficients will reflect the
determination  of on-the-job-search and s u (the effectiveness of unemployed job searchers).  Thus,
under fair shares, we would expect that:
á 1’ä 1’ç 1’1 ; á 2’ä 2’ç 2’&1 ; á 3’ç 4’&( snN) / ˜ S;
á 4’ä 4’&( ö ( E) ) / ˜ S; á 5’ä 5’â 1( ö ( E) ) / ˜ S; á 6’&â 2( snN%ö ( E) ) / ˜ S;
 and ä 3’ç 3’&( suU) / ˜ S; ä 6’ç 6’&â 2( suU) / ˜ S; ç 5’&â 1( suU%snN) / ˜ S.
Finally,  we consider the consequences of our analysis and estimates for the aggregate
matching function. This will take the form:9
(12) lnMt’˜ è 0%˜ è 1lnVt%˜ è 2ln( ö ( Et) %suUt%snNt)
which log-linearised, as previously, becomes:
lnMt’è 0%è 1lnVt%è 2lnUt%è 3ln( Nt/ Ut)
(13) %è 4ln( Jt&1/ Ut) %è 5ln(˜ Yt&1) %è 6ln( U
LT
t / Ut)
and in its restricted form, given fair shares, is:
lnMt’è 0%è 1lnVt%è 2lnUt%
è 2snN
˜ S
ln( Nt/ Ut) %




â 1è 2ö ( E)
˜ S
ln(˜ Yt&1) &â 2è 2( 1 &





It  is clear from equation (14) that the coefficients on the stocks of job searchers will be somewhat
difficult  to interpret. The aggregated coefficients measure the sum of ‘own stock’ effects and job
competition  effects. Consequently, the signs and sizes of the coefficients will depend on the
relative  importance of these effects. If equations (13 and 14) exhibit constant returns to scale then
è 1+è 2=1.   Given the fair shares rule, we would expect the following restrictions to apply to the
aggregate matching function:
 and  á 3’ç 4’è 3/ è 2;á 4’ä 4’è 4/ è 2; á 5’ä 5’è 5/ è 2.
Below,  we estimate the aggregate matching function (14) along with two of the three share
equations (9, 10, 11) and test these restrictions.
III.  Establishing some stylised facts about gross worker flows
a) Using the gross flows data 
It  is possible to examine the issues raised above using data on gross worker flows which the
Australian  Bureau of Statistics (the ABS) has published on an almost continuous basis since late10
7The  core data used in this section are currently published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics as Table 33.
Estimates  of Labour Force Status and Gross Changes (Flows) Derived From Matched Records in  The  Labour Force
Australia ,  6203.0.  Some additional unpublished data was provided by the ABS. Vacancy data is published by the
ABS.  Unemployment stock data come from  The Labour Force Australia .
8For example,  the level of unemployment in December 1986 stood  at 655,000, over the six months prior to that
date  some 480,000 employees had become unemployed and 620,000 had left the state of unemployment for a job.
Similarly, during those six months, there were 1.78  million occasions of people moving from unemployment or
outside of the labour force into employment and 1.64 million  flows in the opposite direction, whilst the level of
employment stood at 7 million. 
1979.
7 The data are derived from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) of households and, in particular,
the matched records  of successive monthly surveys. The ABS surveys a sample of some 30,000
individual  private and non-private dwellings each month. On the basis of this survey, each
indi vidual is assigned a labour market state for the week prior to the survey. The ABS then
constructs  estimates of the stocks of those employed, unemployed and not in the labour force.
The  construction of matched records between months is used to create flow data.
8 The quality of
these  data is affected by a number of factors. First, each month one eighth of the sample is
replaced  and no matching of records of those affected is possible.  Second, it is not possible for
the  ABS to match the records of those surveyed in non-private dwellings. Third, there are the
familiar  problems of non-response and failure to match records of some who move location, etc.
The net result is that only about 80% of survey responses are matched.
Whether,  or not, the fact that 20 per cent of the survey sample are missing from the
matched  records is important for our analysis depends on whether the missing persons are
randomly  distributed across both states and flow groups.  The ABS estimates that only half are
randomly  distributed. The remaining absences may exert some bias on the distribution of the data
we  have to analyse.  There is also a second possible source of error in the data, caused by
classificati on error, since some individuals fail to report their current labour market state
accurately.  An indication of the likely effects of both the missing data problem and the
classification  error problem can be judged from the results presented by Abowd and Zellner
(1985)  and Poterba and Summers (1986) on US data.  (The Current Population Survey data are
very  similar in character to the ABS data used here.) The broad outcome of Abowd and Zellner's
analysis  of reinterview data is to make average adjustments to the gross flows of between -12 to
15  percent due to the missing data problem, and average adjustments of between 8 and 49 percent
as a result of excluding spurious labour market transitions  due to misclassifications. The size of11
these  adjustments suggests caution when interpreting results using the ABS data, since
adjustments of the Abowd and Zellner type are not possible due to a  lack of  information about
the  missing data or classification error. The flows most subject to error, however, are mostly
between  unemployment and not in the labour force. Whilst we believe that those between non-
employment  and employment are not as badly affected, we recognise that our results may be
affected  by these errors. In what follows, therefore, we assume that any missing data are
distributed randomly across flow types, in the absence of any additional information.
b) Not in the labour force.
Whilst  the states of unemployment and employment are clearly established by official definition,
there  remains a major definitional issue concerning those defined to be not in the labour force. For
example,  this residual group contains those in full time education and those institutionalised as
well  as those who may want a job but do not satisfy the definition of  unemployment. For the
definition  of  Nt above we want to specify the subset of those not in the labour force who are
seeking work.
There  are strict availability and job search requirements that must be fulfilled in order for
an  individual who is out of work to be classified as unemployed by the ABS. In particular, it is
required  that the person concerned should want to work, be currently actively looking for work
and  be available to start work within seven days of the interview. This constitutes availability for
work and active job search. Satisfying these criteria is also required by the Commonwealth
Employment Service (the  CES) for those registering for unemployment benefits. However, the
ABS/CES  definition of the number of unemployed may well exclude a number of potential
workers who happen not  to exactly satisfy the criteria, but who we wish to treat as the stock of
job seekers outside of the labour force.
In  the group of non-workers which is classified by the ABS as not in the labour force,
there  is an identified group of people who want to work and are either  actively looking for work
but unavailable to start work immediately (within seven days)  or  not actively looking for work
but  able to start work within four weeks. This group is classified by the ABS as marginally12
9The relative number of marginally attached  women far exceeds that of men. In 1991 the number of marginally
attached  women was about double the number counted as unemployed, whereas the number of marginally attached
men  was half the number unemployed. The number marginally attached is closely related through time to the
number unemployed.
10 Those  who are classified as discouraged job seekers make up a substantial group (between 10% and 19% of both
male  and female marginally attached). In answer to the question as to why no active job search is being undertaken
despite  the desire to have a job, the survey answers that classify an individual as discouraged include the following
alter natives: the belief that the person was considered by employers to be: too young or too old; language
difficulties  or being from a different ethnic background; lack of sufficient skills, training, experience or schooling;
the absence of job vacancies in a given locality or line of work; and a belief that no job vacancies exist at all.
attached  to the labour force.
9 In the Supplementary Labour Force Survey, which has been held
once  or twice a year over recent years, the ABS attempts to distinguish four major reasons for
inactive search: personal reasons; family reasons; discouraged job seekers
10 ;  and reasons of
non-availability  of jobs in suitable hours and other reasons (including misclassification). For both
men  and women, personal and family reasons make up about two thirds of the total. However,
the  majority of women cite family reasons and, in particular, the provision of child care. For men,
personal  reasons of which ill health and attendance at an educational institution are the most
important.
Given  the discussion above, we consider sub-dividing the marginally attached by extracting
those  with the closest attachment to the labour force. Whilst all of the categories of marginally
attached individuals  apply to those who want a job, we identify  those who are actively looking
for  work but are unable to start work within seven days and those who want a job but are not
actively  looking  and are classified as discouraged job seekers, as those groups with characteristics
which  make them job seekers. (In other words, we are not interested in those people who are not
actively  searching because they are physically unable to work.) The adequacy of our definition can
be judged from its use in the econometric work below.
c) Long-term unemployed.
We also consider the possible role of the proportion of long-term unemployed as a potential
determinant  of the hiring rate. We define the long-term unemployed to be those unemployed for
more  than 12 months in their current spell. The arguments presented in Budd  et al (1988) and
rehearsed  in more detail in chapter 7 of Layard  et al (1991) suggest that the proportion of
long-term  unemployed would have a negative effect on the hiring rate.  This is because this13
proportion  indicates the relative size of a group of unemployed persons whose outflow probability
from unemployment is  significantly lower than others, purely because of the length of time that
they have been unemployed for.
d) Job to job flows.
The  one important flow not covered by the gross flows data is that between jobs. As there is no
change  in labour market status in going from one job to another, the LFS fails to pick up
movements  across jobs between interviews. Evidence for a number of countries suggests that such
flows  are substantial (Davis et al, 1996). Here we estimate the size of these flows from the annual
LFS survey question which covers current  job duration for those currently employed excluding
those  who had no previous job in the year. Assuming that the duration of such jobs is replicated
across  the year we obtain a rate of job to job movements over a year. This annual rate is then
interpolat ed into a quarterly rate and, with the use of the quarterly employment stock data, a
quarterly  flow is obtained. This is clearly an approximate method for calculating this important
flow,  however, we feel that it is superior to alternatives in the literature such as Blanchard and
Diamond  (1991) who apply a proportion of the quit rate in US manufacturing to the total
employment  stock to obtain a job to job flow for the whole economy. The success of our measure
in the  econometric analysis makes us more confident of its value.
e) Vacancies.
The  final measurement issue is that of the number of available vacant jobs. In most countries the
prime  source of vacancy data is the government agency which runs employment offices (in
Australia,  this is the CES). We investigate the relationship between this data source and more
general survey based data (produced by the ABS). The ABS series we use measures all the
vacancies  that firms claim to have available to be filled.  Thus, it is a better measure than the CES
series  (which only covers those reported to their offices) or those based only on newspaper
advertisements of vacant jobs. In brief, we find  that the survey-based vacancy data produced by
the  ABS dominates CES vacancy series in the decisions of all job seekers suggesting that the latter
is  a subset of the former.  We believe these data are superior to that used in studies of European
labour market flows such as Burda and Wyplosz (1994) and Burgess (1993).  14
11 z1:  Lagrange Multiplier test for up to 4th order autocorrelation distributed  ÷
2(4);   z2:  Reset test for incorrect
functional  form distributed  ÷
2(1);   z3:  Jarque-Bera test for non-normality distributed   ÷
2(2);   z4:  test for
heteroscedasticity distributed   ÷
2(1).
IV.   Results.
In  this section we first present estimates of the individual share of total matches equations (9, 10
and  11) and the aggregate matching function (13). We then provide tests of the various
restrictions  generated by the discussion in Section II, above. In particular, we analyse joint
estimation  of two of the share equations and the aggregate matching function and test the fair
shares  hypothesis. Rejection of these restrictions leads us to analysis of the individual equation
estimates  and comparison of our specifications with those previously proposed for the outflow
rate from unemployment.
a) Disaggregate matching.
In  Tables 1, 2 and 3 we present estimates for unemployment, not-in-the labour force and job-to-
job  flows respectively. We begin discussion with estimates of the unemployment outflows into
jobs,  equation (9), in Table 1. Column 1 gives unrestricted estimates. The estimated coefficients
are  of the anticipated sign if not all that well determined. The coefficients on the determinants of
employed  job search and unemployment search intensity are both significant and of size and sign
consistent  with the theory presented in Section III.  There is no evidence of model misspecification
at the 95% confidence level from misspecification tests  z1 to  z4 
11  and  no evidence of instrument
invalidity  from the Sargan test ( z5).  The additional instruments employed are two lags of the
logarithms of total hires and  total vacancies. The coefficient on the log of total hires is less than
one  but not significantly so. A Wald test ( z6)  of this restriction is accepted at a low level of
significance.  Therefore, we impose this restriction in column 2 in line with the discussion above.
All  the right hand side variables are either flows lagged one period or stocks measured at the start
of  the period and thus predetermined so OLS is used to estimate the restricted equation. The
estimate of the sum  of shares of effective job searchers is the coefficient on  lnUt   equal to -0.84.
Restricting  this to minus unity is easily accepted as the  ÷
2(1)  statistic  z6 shows. Final restricted
estimates  are given in column 3. All coefficients are well determined. In particular, the coefficients
on    ln(Nt/Ut)  and  ln( Jt-1/Ut)  are significant and suggest both NLF and employed job searchers have
a  significant share of   when viewed from the perspective of hires from  unemployment. ˜ St
According  to the results, the steady-state shares of the NLF and OJS in the total stock of15
12 In order  to make comparison between this equation and those for hires from the other two sources comparable,
we  adopt the transformation originally proposed by Bewley (1979). The coefficients on the stocks of searchers are
long-run coefficients whilst the short-run dynamics are captured by the coefficients on  Ä
2(ln(N/L)t-2-lnMt-2).
Consistent estimates of these equations is achieved by employing  (ln(N/L)t-2-lnMt-2) as an additional instrument.
13 Estimation  of this equation using either the total number of those outside of the labour force or the wider measure
of marginal attachment as  Nt  is dominated by the results given in Table 2 using a non-nested test.
searchers  are 51% and 28%, respectively. The implied share of the effective unemployed is 21%.
A further important feature of our results  is the significant negative coefficient on the long-term
unemplo yment ratio. This demonstrates that the search effectiveness of those unemployed for
more  than 12 months is significantly lower than that of the short-term. This confirms the results
for  the UK in Budd  et al (1988) and Burgess (1993). Finally, we find evidence for the idea of pro-
cyclical  success in on-the-job search from the significant positive coefficient on   ln( ).  We ˜ Yt&1
analyse the nature of this relationship further below.
These  results show that all three potential groups of searchers are important components
of  the stock of job searchers     for  outflows into jobs from unemployment. This finding  supports ˜ St
and  extends the results of Burgess (1993), amongst others. We have been able to make more
precise  the view that there is significant job competition between the unemployed and employed
job  seekers because we find a measure of the determinants of employed job search to be
significant.  Furthermore, we find that those job seekers who are NLF also provide effective
competition  for the unemployed for jobs. We consider formal comparisons of our model with
others in (d), below.
The model for job inflows from outside of the labour force was estimated in a similar
fashion  to that for job inflows from unemployment. Estimates of equation (10) are given in Table
2  where the initial (unreported) finding of significant second-order serial correlation led to the
inclusion
12  of the term  Ä
2(ln(N/L)t-2-lnMt-2).  The estimated coefficients are all of the anticipated
sign although the  cyclical indicator variable has an incorrectly signed and insignificant impact.
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The  estimated value of the coefficient on  lnMt is again close  to one in the unrestricted estimates
in  column 1. The test of the restriction ( z6)  is again accepted at a low level of significance. These
results  suggest that, in the aggregate, the probability of a job seeker from outside of the labour
force  getting an acceptable job offer is affected by the number of all other classes of other job16
seekers.  The impact of the cyclical variable and long-term unemployment proportion are not well
defined in this set  of results. The estimated shares of the unemployed and employed job seekers
are 16% and 23%, respectively. The implied share of the NLF is consequently 61%.
Finally,  we consider job-to-job flows in Table 3. The process of model restriction followed
is  identical to that for the first two flow equations. Again, the equations are well determined. The
restriction  that the job-to-job flow be modelled as a share of total matches is accepted easily
Adding  up, however, can only be accepted at the 2% level. For comparisons sake, we present the
final  restricted estimates in column 3. All coefficients are of the anticipated sign. Interestingly, the
coefficients  on the long-term unemployment ratio and the cyclical determinant of OJS are both
significant  and of the predicted sign. The implied steady-state shares are substantially different
from those generated by  the two share equations for the unemployed and NLF flows; the share
of  the unemployed and NLF job seekers is 22% and 9%, respectively and the implied share of the
employed is 69%.
b) Aggregate matching.
Estimates  of the aggregate matching function, equation (13), are given in Table 4. They support
the  modelling in Section 2 in that measures of the number of job searchers other than the
unemployed  have a significant impact on total matches. Constant returns to scale are imposed in
column 2 whilst in column 1 the estimates are unrestricted. The  ÷
2(1)  test of this restriction is
easily  accepted. The aggregate searcher stock elasticity of matching is 0.94. Consequently, from
the  coefficients on  Nt and  Jt-1,  we can derive estimates if the steady-state shares of effective NLF
searchers  of 36% and of employed job seekers of 57%. Neither coefficients on the cyclical
determinant  of employed job search or the long-term unemployment ratio are significant. The
searcher  stock elasticity is very high and the consequent vacancy elasticity of 0.06 very low,
implying  a very inefficient processing of vacancies into hires. Also, the implied share of
unemployed  effective searchers in the total is only 6%, a very small value. Taken together, these
results  may suggest that the aggregate matching function is not a good vehicle for examining the
matching  process and that the simple aggregation of individual job searcher group matching
function allowed by fair shares is not supported by the data, an issue to which we turn next.17
14 Given  the estimation method used (3SLS), the estimates are not invariant to the share equation excluded. There
is,  however, very little difference in the estimates of the restricted parameters between alternative share equation
exclusion and no difference in inference.
c) Fair shares.
We test the fair shares hypothesis by estimating a system of two flow share equations and the
aggregate matching function. Under fair shares,  four structural parameters are derived from the
parameter  estimates which should be identical in each of the three equations. This provides for
eight  restrictions on twelve parameters. The restrictions on equations (9), (10) and (13) are given
in Table 5. 
Thus,  Table 5 presents restricted estimates employing the unemployment and NLF outflow
share  equations, along with the aggregate matching function.
14  The restricted parameter estimates
are  well determined and consistent with our model. The restrictions are, however, resoundingly
rejected.  The Wald test of the eight restrictions has a value far in excess of conventional levels of
sig nificance. Thus, it appears that fair shares is rejected whilst the general specification is
supported. 
Consequently,  we examine the full set of structural parameters for each of the inflow
equations  (9,10 and 11) and the aggregate equation (13). Whilst we have discussed these
equations  on a separate basis in (a) and (b) above, it is of interest to provide some comparison of
the  results here. We can quickly see, from Table 6, that our conclusions would differ depending
on  which equation we address. For example, if we consider the outflows from unemployment in
equation  (9) there is a substantial procyclical effect related to employed job searchers competing
for  jobs, there is also evidence of the long-term unemployed being much less effective job seekers.
Neither  of these findings are true when considering the outflows from not in the labour force
(equation  (10)). Considering the flows between jobs, equation (11),  we once again find a
significant  procyclical effect on employed job seekers and a negative impact of long-term
unemployment  on the search effectiveness of the unemployed. However, there is now a much
larger  share going to employed job seekers than those NLF, implying that these employers are
ranking the NLF third below the employed and the unemployed. 
Our  results clearly suggest that there are distinct groups amongst job searchers with18
differing  degrees of search effectiveness and/or rankings across these groups in the hiring process.
If  this is indeed the case, then the simple functional form commonly assumed for aggregate
matching  functions is not valid and the latter ‘should be taken only as data descriptions, or as log-
linear  approximations to yet underived matching functions’ (Blanchard and Diamond, 1989;18).
This may explain  why our estimates of the aggregate matching function are not satisfactory and
why  there are large discrepancies amongst the results found by different authors when using these
functions (Broersma, 1996). To reiterate, whilst fair shares  would suggest that the simple
aggregate  matching function would take the same form as the individual matching functions, our
rejection  of the fair shares rule suggests that this simplification is not valid. Our results suggest
a more complex functional form for the aggregate matching function is necessary.
d) Comparative testing.
An important aspect of our results is evidence of those groups  competing with the unemployed
for  hires. Comparison with previous work on unemployment outflows is easily made. First, in line
with  Burgess’ (1993) argument, we have found that the coefficient on total hires ( á 1 in equation
(9))  is equal to one once we allow for job competition from relevant other job seekers by
including  measures of employed and NLF job searchers. His equation excludes such measures.
Estimates  of Burgess’ model for our data are given in column 1 of Table 7. Note that the
coefficient on total hires is  substantially less than one in line with his results. The Wald test ( z6)
confirms  that this difference is significant at the 99% level. Formally, the significance of  ln(Nt/Ut),
ln(Jt-1/Ut) and  ln( )  in the equation in column 3 of Table 1 means that our model encompasses ˜ Yt&1
that  of Burgess. We find that competition from not-in-the-labour-force and employed job seekers
is an identifiable improvement on previous models of unemployment outflows into jobs.
A second comparison can also be made with the traditional approach of estimating an
individual  matching function for the unemployed which only depends on vacancies and the stock
of  unemployed. Given the unlikely (implicit) assumption of independence highlighted above, we
would  expect that our model would dominate this approach. A representative model is a log-linear
version  of equation (5) above where we also allow the outflow rate from unemployment to be
affected  by the proportion of long-term unemployed.  Estimates that confirm approximately
constant  returns to scale and some state dependence of unemployment outflows are given in19
column  2 of Table 7. The non-nested tests given show that the traditional model adds nothing
significant to the  explanation of the outflow rate from unemployment provided by the model in
column  3 of Table 1. They also show that our model adds very significantly to the traditional
model.
 The job competition model presented here  captures an empirically important feature of
unemployment  outflows into jobs; that interdependence of hiring from different labour market
states  matters. This result has implications for a large literature on the outflow rate and duration
dependen ce of individual outflows from unemployment (eg., Narendranathan  et al,  1985). The
accurate modelling of the behaviour of competitors needs to be added to such analysis.
IV.  Conclusions
The  literature on matching functions has, until recently, concentrated almost entirely on the
outflow  from unemployment into jobs. We show that this approach fails to capture important
features  of the process of vacant job matching with the available job seekers. We also show that
the incorrect assumption of the independence of flows from unemployment into jobs leads to
misspecified estimates of the parameter of interest, namely the unemployment elasticity of
matching.  This paper provides more evidence in favour of the case for a much more general
approach  to the analysis of worker flows. We show that substantial numbers of new worker hires
come  from all three possible alternative sources: unemployment, employment and outside of the
labour  force. We find evidence in favour of significant job competition between the three groups.
This does not seem,  however, to be consistent with the individual groups of searchers receiving
fair  shares of the available hires. The differences in behaviour and interdependencies of these flows
that  we find suggest that worker heterogeneity is an important feature of gross worker flows
across  labour markets. This may well be explained by employers ranking job searchers by group.
Our results show that these features should be reflected in models of the dynamics of labour
market adjustment and form the basis of ongoing research.20
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Table 1.   Outflows from unemployment.
ln (X t /U t ) 1 2 3
constant -2.57 -2.88 -1.81
(1.22) (1.64) (41.6)
ln M t 0.84 1.00 1.00
(1.57) (-) (-)
ln U t  -0.70  -0.84 -1.00 
(1.28) (3.09) (-)    
ln(N t /U t ) -0.28  -0.300 -0.51
(0.71) (0.82) (5.05)
ln(J t-1 /U t ) -0.18  -0.28  -0.28 
(0.51) (6.58) (6.66)
ln( ) 1.79   1.79 1.90 ˜ Yt&1
(3.35) (3.55) (4.04)




0.92  0.92 0.95 ¯ R
2
se 0.0351 0.0332 0.0329
z 1 3.97 4.71 4.37
z 2 4.34 0.34 3.26
z 3 0.35 0.27 0.21
z 4 1.39 3.21  2.35  
z 5( ÷
2(3)) 2.86 - -
z 6( ÷
2(1)) 0.09  0.37 -
Estimation  period: 1980q4 - 1991q4. Equations also include seasonal dummy variables. Methods
of estimation: column 1, IV; columns 2 and 3, OLS. Additional instruments for column 1:
lnMt-1, lnVt , lnMt-2, lnVt-1  . t-statistics in parentheses.22
Table 2.   Outflows from not-in-the labour force.
ln(L t /N t ) 1 2 3  
constant -3.07 -2.95 -1.09
(2.21) (2.55) (33.3)
Ä
2[ln(L  t  /N  t  )-log M t ]  0.23  0.23 0.26
(2.41) (2.64) (3.24)
lnM t 1.08  1.00 1.00
(2.98) (-) (-)
lnN t -0.78  -0.71  -1.00
(2.34) (4.00) (-)
ln(U t /N t ) -0.26 -0.25  -0.16
(3.27) (3.71) (4.44)
ln(J t-1 /N t ) -0.28  -0.23  -0.23
(1.22) (8.31) (8.57)
ln( ) -0.22  -0.23 -0.004 ˜ Yt&1
(0.65) (0.66) (0.01)




0.98  0.95  0.94  ¯ R
2
se 0.0205 0.0211 0.0206
z 1 3.99 6.59 5.33
z 2 0.05 3.69  4.38
*
z 3 1.28 1.12 1.39
z 4 0.84 2.85 2.44
z 5( ÷
2(3)) 1.73 - -
z 6( ÷
2(1)) 0.05 2.58 -
Estimation period: 1980q4 - 1991q4. Equations include seasonal dummy variables. Method of
estimation:  IV; column 2 and 3   ln(Lt-2/Nt-2)-lnMt-2,  in place of  Ä
2[ln(L t /N t )-lnMt].   Additional
instruments  for column 1:  lnMt-1, lnVt , ln Mt-2, lnVt-1, [ln(Lt-2/Nt-2)-lnMt-2],  t-statistics in
parentheses.23
Table 3.   Job to job flows.
ln (J t /J t-1 ) 1 2 3
constant 2.45  2.26  -0.71
(1.89) (1.82) (21.7)
lnM t 0.92 1.00 1.00
(3.42) (-) (-)
ln(J t-1 ) -1.39  -1.46 -1.00 
(4.69) (7.67) (-)    
ln(U t /J t-1 ) -0.07  -0.08  -0.22
(0.96) (1.20) (5.41)
ln(N t /J t-1 ) -0.68  -0.68  -0.09 
(2.73) (2.70) (1.62)
ln( ) -0.31  -0.32 -0.61 ˜ Yt&1
(0.88) (0.89) (1.73)




0.56  0.96 0.91 ¯ R
2
se 0.0227 0.0233 0.0248
z 1 3.13 4.46 4.57
z 2 0.46 0.01 1.65
z 3 1.25 2.27 1.25
z 4 0.16 1.03  0.01  
z 5( ÷
2(3)) 4.46 - -
z 6( ÷
2(1)) 0.10  5.75
* -
Estimation  period: 1980q4 - 1991q4. Equations also include seasonal dummy variables. Methods
of estimation: column 1, IV; columns 2 and 3, OLS. Additional instruments for column 1:
lnMt-1, lnVt , lnMt-2, lnVt-1  . t-statistics in parentheses.24
Table 4.   The aggregate matching function.
ln M t 1 2
constant 1.28  0.99  
(0.98) (23.5)
lnV t 0.06 0.06
(2.10) (2.17)
lnU t  0.89   0.94 
(4.44) (-)   
ln(N t /U t ) 0.28   0.34  
(1.07) (6.27)
ln(J t-1 /U t ) 0.54   0.54  
(10.7) (10.9)
ln( ) -0.27  -0.30 ˜ Yt&1
(0.69) (0.84)




0.95  0.99 ¯ R
2
se 0.0247 0.0243
z 1 4.71 4.66
z 2 1.06 2.17
z 3 0.86 1.16
z 4 0.04 0.17 
z 5( ÷
2(1)) 0.05 -
Estimation  period: 1980q4 - 1991q4. Equations also include seasonal dummy variables. Methods
of estimation: OLS. t-statistics in parentheses.25
Table 5. The restricted model. 
System  of unemployment and not-in-the-labour-force outflow equations and aggregate matching
functions; equations (9), (10) and (14).
Eight cross-equation restrictions:
eqn (9) eqn (10) eqn (14)
&á 4 ’&ä 4 ’è 4/ è 2 ’( ö ( E) ) / ˜ S
&á 3 ’( 1 %ä 3%ä 4) ’è 3/ è 2 ’( snN) / ˜ S
á 5/ á 4 ’ä 5/ ä 4 ’&è 5/ è 4 ’â 1
á 6/ ( á 3%á 4) ’ä 6/ ä 3 ’&è 6/ ( è 2&è 3&è 4) ’â 2
Estimates:
( ö ( E) ) / ˜ S: 0 . 27 ( 0 . 02 ) â 1: 2 . 76 ( 0 . 62 )
( snN) / ˜ S: 0 . 59 ( 0 . 025 ) â 2: 0 . 27 ( 0 . 04 )
è 2: 0 . 84 ( 0 . 02 )





Wald test of restrictions:  ÷
2(8) = 203.3
Estimation  period: 1980q4 - 1991q4. Equations include seasonal dummy variables. Method of
estimation:  3SLS. Instruments:  lnUt  ,    lnNt ,   lnJt-1,   ln ,   ln ,   lnVt ,   [ln(Lt-2/Nt-2)-lnMt-2], ˜ Yt&1 ( U
LT
t / Ut)
constant and seasonal dummy variables. Standard errors in parentheses 26
Table 6.   Equation by equation estimates of the structural parameters.
                                                                                          
Outflows                               Shares                                               Cycle     Implied search effectiveness



















eqn (11) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (1.08) (0.10)
aggregate 0.57
** 0.36
** 0.06 0.56 0.29
eqn (14) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.66) (0.74)
Standard  errors in parentheses. 
** significantly  different to zero at the 95% confidence level, 
** significantly  different to zero at the 88% confidence level.27
Table 7.   Unemployment to  job flows - a comparison.
Log (X t /U t ) 1 2
constant -3.47 -0.496
(5.53) (1.03)
lnM t 0.698      
(10.14)        
lnV t        0.202 
       (7.73)
lnU t -0.397 -0.206
(10.93) (3.76)
ln(LTU t /U t ) -0.156 -0.317
(3.89) (5.01)
0.898 0.837 ¯ R
2
se 0.0401 0.0503
z 1 4.27 2.77
z 2 0.38 6.24
**
z 3 0.19 2.40







a) SC_c test of Pesaran and Pesaran (1995)
M1 against M2 -10.31
**
M2 against M1 1.65
b) PE test of MacKinnon, White and Davidson (1983)
M1 against M2 7.37
**
M2 against M1 1.01
where M1: traditional model in column 2 above, M2: model in column 3 of Table 1.
Estimation period: 1980q4 - 1991q4.
Methods of estimation: column 1, IV; column 2, OLS. Additional instruments for column 1: 
lnMt-1, lnVt , lnMt-2, lnVt-1  . t-values in parentheses.